Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Drugs, or Both (DUI / DUI-D), and Driving While Ability Impaired (DWAI) (42-4-1301)

1. 1. It is a misdemeanor for any person who is under the influence of alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, to drive any vehicle in this state.
   2. It is a misdemeanor for any person who is impaired by alcohol or by one or more drugs, or by a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, to drive any vehicle in this state.
   3. It is a misdemeanor for any person who is an habitual user of any controlled substance defined in section 12-22-303 (7), C.R.S., to drive any vehicle in this state.
   4. For the purposes of this subsection (1), one or more drugs shall mean all substances defined as a drug in section 12-22-303 (13), C.R.S., and all controlled substances defined in section 12-22-303 (7), C.R.S., and glue-sniffing, aerosol inhalation, and the inhalation of any other toxic vapor or vapors.
   5. The fact that any person charged with a violation of this subsection (1) is or has been entitled to use one or more drugs under the laws of this state, including, but not limited to, the medical use of marijuana pursuant to section 18-18-406.3, C.R.S., shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this subsection (1).
   6. “Driving under the influence” means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, which alcohol alone, or one or more drugs alone, or alcohol combined with one or more drugs affects the person to a degree that the person is substantially incapable, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle.
   7. “Driving while ability impaired” means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, which alcohol alone, or one or more drugs alone, or alcohol combined with one or more drugs, affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person ordinarily would have been, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle.
   8. Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging the offense of DUI, it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as “drove a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both”.
   9. Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging the offense of DWAI, it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as “drove a vehicle while impaired by alcohol or drugs or both”.
2. 1. It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive any vehicle in this state when the person’s BAC is 0.08 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving. During a trial, if the state’s evidence raises the issue, or if a defendant presents some credible evidence, that the defendant consumed alcohol between the time that the defendant stopped driving and the time that testing occurred, such issue shall be an affirmative defense, and the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the minimum 0.08 blood or breath alcohol content required in this paragraph (a) was reached as a result of alcohol consumed by the defendant before the defendant stopped driving.
      1. It is a class A traffic infraction for any person under twenty-one years of age to drive any vehicle in this state when the person’s BAC, as shown by analysis of the person’s breath, is at least 0.02 but not more than 0.05 at the time of driving or within two hours after driving. The court, upon sentencing a defendant pursuant to this subparagraph (I), may, in addition to any penalty imposed under a class A traffic infraction, order that the defendant perform up to twenty-four hours of useful public service, subject to the conditions and restrictions of section 18-1.3-507, C.R.S., and may further order that the defendant submit to and complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program at such defendant’s own expense.
      2. A second or subsequent violation of this paragraph (a.5) shall be a class 2 traffic misdemeanor.
   2. In any prosecution for the offense of DUI per se, the defendant shall be entitled to offer direct and circumstantial evidence to show that there is a disparity between what the tests show and other facts so that the trier of fact could infer that the tests were in some way defective or inaccurate. Such evidence may include testimony of nonexpert witnesses relating to the absence of any or all of the common symptoms or signs of intoxication for the purpose of impeachment of the accuracy of the analysis of the person’s blood or breath.
   3. Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging the offense of DUI per se, it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as “drove a vehicle with excessive alcohol content”.
3. The offenses described in subsections (1) and (2) of this section are strict liability offenses.
4. No court shall accept a plea of guilty to a non-alcohol-related or non-drug-related traffic offense or guilty to the offense of UDD from a person charged with DUI, DUI per se, or habitual user; except that the court may accept a plea of guilty to a non-alcohol-related or non-drug-related traffic offense or to UDD upon a good faith representation by the prosecuting attorney that the attorney could not establish a prima facie case if the defendant were brought to trial on the original alcohol-related or drug-related offense.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-408, C.R.S., during a trial of any person accused of both DUI and DUI per se, the court shall not require the prosecution to elect between the two violations. The court or a jury may consider and convict the person of either DUI or DWAI, or DUI per se, or both DUI and DUI per se, or both DWAI and DUI per se. If the person is convicted of more than one violation, the sentences imposed shall run concurrently.
6. 1. In any prosecution for DUI or DWAI, the defendant’s BAC at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or within a reasonable time thereafter gives rise to the following presumptions or inferences:
      1. If at such time the defendant’s BAC was 0.05 or less, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol and that the defendant’s ability to operate a vehicle was not impaired by the consumption of alcohol.
      2. If at such time the defendant’s BAC was in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08, such fact gives rise to the permissible inference that the defendant’s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol, and such fact may also be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
      3. If at such time the defendant’s BAC was 0.08 or more, such fact gives rise to the permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
   2. The limitations of this subsection (6) shall not be construed as limiting the introduction, reception, or consideration of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or whether or not the defendant’s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol.
   3. In all actions, suits, and judicial proceedings in any court of this state concerning alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offenses, the court shall take judicial notice of methods of testing a person’s alcohol or drug level and of the design and operation of devices, as certified by the department of public health and environment, for testing a person’s blood, breath, saliva, or urine to determine such person’s alcohol or drug level. The department of public health and environment may, by rule, determine that, because of the reliability of the results from certain devices, the collection or preservation of a second sample of a person’s blood, saliva, or urine or the collection and preservation of a delayed breath alcohol specimen is not required. This paragraph (c) shall not prevent the necessity of establishing during a trial that the testing devices used were working properly and that such testing devices were properly operated. Nothing in this paragraph (c) shall preclude a defendant from offering evidence concerning the accuracy of testing devices.
   4. If a person refuses to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests as provided in section 42-4-1301.1 and such person subsequently stands trial for DUI or DWAI, the refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests shall be admissible into evidence at the trial, and a person may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests.
   5. Involuntary blood test – admissibility. Evidence acquired through an involuntary blood test pursuant to section 42-4-1301.1 (3) shall be admissible in any prosecution for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, habitual user, or UDD, and in any prosecution for criminally negligent homicide pursuant to section 18-3-105, C.R.S., vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106 (1) (b), C.R.S., assault in the third degree pursuant to section 18-3-204, C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205 (1) (b), C.R.S.
   6. Chemical test – admissibility. Strict compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the department of public health and environment shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial unless the court finds that the extent of noncompliance with a board of health rule has so impaired the validity and reliability of the testing method and the test results as to render the evidence inadmissible. In all other circumstances, failure to strictly comply with such rules and regulations shall only be considered in the weight to be given to the test results and not to the admissibility of such test results.
   7. It shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial that the prosecution present testimony concerning the composition of any kit used to obtain blood, urine, saliva, or breath specimens. A sufficient evidentiary foundation concerning the compliance of such kits with the rules and regulations of the department of public health and environment shall be established by the introduction of a copy of the manufacturer’s or supplier’s certificate of compliance with such rules and regulations if such certificate specifies the contents, sterility, chemical makeup, and amounts of chemicals contained in such kit.
   8. In any trial for a violation of this section, the testimony of a law enforcement officer that he or she witnessed the taking of a blood specimen by a person who the law enforcement officer reasonably believed was authorized to withdraw blood specimens shall be sufficient evidence that such person was so authorized, and testimony from the person who obtained the blood specimens concerning such person’s authorization to obtain blood specimens shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results concerning the blood specimens obtained.
   9. 1. Following the lawful contact with a person who has been driving a vehicle, and when a law enforcement officer reasonably suspects that a person was driving a vehicle while under the influence of or while impaired by alcohol, the law enforcement officer may conduct a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the executive director of the department of public health and environment after first advising the driver that the driver may either refuse or agree to provide a sample of the driver’s breath for such preliminary test; except that, if the driver is under twenty-one years of age, the law enforcement officer may, after providing such advisement to the person, conduct such preliminary screening test if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has consumed any alcohol.
      2. The results of this preliminary screening test may be used by a law enforcement officer in determining whether probable cause exists to believe such person was driving a vehicle in violation of this section and whether to administer a test pursuant to section 42-4-1301.1 (2).
      3. Neither the results of such preliminary screening test nor the fact that the person refused such test shall be used in any court action except in a hearing outside of the presence of a jury, when such hearing is held to determine if a law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that the driver committed a violation of this section. The results of such preliminary screening test shall be made available to the driver or the driver’s attorney on request.
7. Penalties
   1. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (II) and (IV) of this paragraph (a), every person who is convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or habitual user shall be punished by:
         1. Imprisonment in the county jail for not less than five days nor more than one year, the minimum period of which shall be mandatory except as otherwise provided in section 42-4-1301.3; and
         2. In the court’s discretion, a fine of not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars; and
         3. Not less than forty-eight hours nor more than ninety-six hours of useful public service, the performance of the minimum period of which shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service.
      2. Upon conviction of a violation described in sub-subparagraph (A) or (B) of subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (a), an offender shall be punished by:
         1. Imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year, the minimum period of which shall be mandatory; except that the court may suspend up to eighty days of the period of imprisonment if the offender complies with the provisions of section 42-4-1301.3; and
         2. In the court’s discretion, a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars; and
         3. Not less than sixty hours nor more than one hundred twenty hours of useful public service, the performance of the minimum period of which shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service.
      3. Subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a) shall apply to:
         1. A conviction for DUI, DUI per se, or habitual user, which violation occurred at any time after the date of a previous violation, for which there has been a conviction, for DUI, DUI per se, or habitual user, or for vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., or of driving while such person’s driver’s license was under restraint pursuant to section 42-2-138 (4) (b); or
         2. A conviction for DUI, DWAI, or DUI per se when the person’s BAC was 0.20 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving.
      4. Upon a conviction for DUI, DUI per se, or habitual user, which violation occurred at any time after the date of a previous violation, for which there has been a conviction, for DWAI, an offender shall be punished by:
         1. Imprisonment in the county jail for not less than seventy days nor more than one year, the minimum period of which shall be mandatory; except that the court may suspend up to sixty-three days of the period of imprisonment if the offender complies with the provisions of section 42-4-1301.3; and
         2. In the court’s discretion, a fine of not less than four hundred fifty dollars nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars; and
         3. Not less than fifty-six hours nor more than one hundred twelve hours of useful public service, the performance of the minimum period of service which shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service.
   2. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (II) and (III) of this paragraph (b), every person who is convicted of DWAI shall be punished by:
         1. Imprisonment in the county jail for not less than two days nor more than one hundred eighty days, the minimum period of which shall be mandatory except as provided in section 42-4-1301.3; and
         2. In the court’s discretion, a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars; and
         3. Not less than twenty-four hours nor more than forty-eight hours of useful public service, the performance of the minimum period of which shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service.
      2. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense of DWAI, an offender shall be punished by:
         1. Imprisonment in the county jail for not less than forty-five days nor more than one year, the minimum period of which shall be mandatory; except that the court may suspend up to forty days of the period of imprisonment if the offender complies with the provisions of section 42-4-1301.3; and
         2. In the court’s discretion, a fine of not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars; and
         3. Not less than forty-eight hours nor more than ninety-six hours of useful public service, the performance of the minimum period of which shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service.
      3. Upon conviction for DWAI, which violation occurred at any time after the date of a previous violation, for which there has been a conviction, for DUI, DUI per se, or habitual user, or vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., or of driving while such person’s driver’s license was under restraint as described in section 42-2-138 (4) (b), an offender shall be punished by:
         1. Imprisonment in the county jail for not less than sixty days nor more than one year, the minimum period of which shall be mandatory; except that the court may suspend up to fifty-four days of the period of imprisonment if the offender complies with the provisions of section 42-4-1301.3; and
         2. In the court’s discretion, a fine of not less than four hundred dollars nor more than one thousand two hundred dollars; and
         3. Not less than fifty-two hours nor more than one hundred four hours of useful public service, the performance of the minimum period of which shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend the mandatory minimum period of performance of such service.
      4. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2002, p. 1898, § 2, effective July 1, 2002.)
   3. 1. For the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (7), a person shall be deemed to have a previous conviction for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or habitual user, or vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., if such person has been convicted under the laws of any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of an act that, if committed within this state, would constitute the offense of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or habitual user, or vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205 (1) (b) (I), C.R.S.
      2. For sentencing purposes concerning convictions for second and subsequent offenses, prima facie proof of a defendant’s previous convictions shall be established when the prosecuting attorney and the defendant stipulate to the existence of the prior conviction or convictions or the prosecuting attorney presents to the court a copy of the driving record of the defendant provided by the department of revenue of this state, or provided by a similar agency in another state, that contains a reference to such previous conviction or convictions or presents an authenticated copy of the record of the previous conviction or judgment from any court of record of this state or from a court of any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The court shall not proceed to immediate sentencing when there is not a stipulation to prior convictions or if the prosecution requests an opportunity to obtain a driving record or a copy of a court record. The prosecuting attorney shall not be required to plead or prove any previous convictions at trial, and sentencing concerning convictions for second and subsequent offenses shall be a matter to be determined by the court at sentencing.
      3. As used in this part 13, “convicted” includes a plea of no contest accepted by the court.
   4. In addition to the penalties prescribed in this subsection (7):
      1. Persons convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, habitual user, and UDD are subject to the costs imposed by section 24-4.1-119 (1) (c), C.R.S., relating to the crime victim compensation fund.
      2. Persons convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, and habitual user are subject to an additional penalty surcharge of not less than fifty dollars and not more than five hundred dollars for programs to address persistent drunk drivers. The minimum penalty surcharge shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to suspend or waive the surcharge; except that the court may suspend or waive the surcharge for a defendant determined by the court to be indigent. Any moneys collected for such surcharge shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the persistent drunk driver cash fund created by section 42-3-303.
      3. Persons convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, habitual user, and UDD are subject to a surcharge of fifteen dollars to be transmitted to the state treasurer who shall deposit said surcharges in the Colorado traumatic brain injury trust fund created pursuant to section 26-1-309, C.R.S.
   5. In addition to any other penalty provided by law, the court may sentence a defendant who is convicted pursuant to this section to a period of probation for purposes of treatment not to exceed two years; in addition, a court may also sentence a defendant who is twice or more convicted pursuant to this section to a period of probation not to exceed two additional years for the purpose of monitoring compliance with court orders. As a condition of probation, the defendant shall be required to make restitution in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-205, C.R.S.
   6. In addition to any other penalty provided by law, the court may sentence a defendant to attend and pay for one appearance at a victim impact panel approved by the court, for which the fee assessed to the defendant shall not exceed twenty-five dollars.
   7. In addition to any fines, fees, or costs levied against a person convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, habitual user, and UDD, the judge shall assess each such person for the cost of the presentence or postsentence alcohol and drug evaluation and supervision services.
   8. In addition to any other penalties prescribed in this part 13, the court shall assess an amount, not to exceed one hundred twenty dollars, upon any person required to perform useful public service.
8. A second or subsequent violation of this section committed by a person under eighteen years of age may be filed in juvenile court.

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